Security
cPGuard supply chain attack: check your server and WordPress sites
Check for the cPGuard supply chain attack on your server, identify malicious updates, rotate exposed credentials and secure every hosted WordPress site.
I recover hacked WordPress sites, remove malware and find how the attacker got in so I can address the cause of reinfection. Every enquiry gets a free assessment, and a standard single-site cleanup is a fixed $149.
From $149 per site
A fixed $149 covers a standard cleanup of one site with working hosting access, agreed after the free assessment. A server, a multisite network or repeated reinfection gets a fixed quote before work starts.
If the same infection comes back within 30 days of the cleanup, I clean it again free.
Scope & Deliverables
Free assessment, fixed $149 single-site cleanup
About 17 hacked WordPress sites recovered
Persistent malware and reinfection cleanup
WordPress admin and cPanel access recovery
VPS investigation and cleanup over SSH
Entry point analysis and security hardening
Backups, monitoring and post-cleanup protection
A hacked WordPress site can involve more than removing a suspicious file. Access may be locked, scripts may be injected into several locations, or an attacker may still have a way back into the site.
I start by assessing what is still accessible and what appears to be affected. I can work through WordPress, cPanel or a VPS over SSH, depending on the hosting setup. I have restored locked-out WordPress admin access and helped regain access through cPanel when normal login routes were no longer available.
The first goal is to contain the problem. That can include blocking active attacks or bad bots, changing compromised credentials and limiting access while I investigate.
Before you get in touch, you can check the site with WP Front Door (opens in a new tab), my free tool, which reports signs of a hacked site such as cloaking, spam and injection patterns, and blocklist status.
I inspect the WordPress installation for malicious files, modified code and injected scripts, then remove what does not belong there. I also check themes, plugins, uploads and other areas where malicious code can remain after an initial cleanup.
On some sites, I have found and removed malware that scans from Sucuri and Wordfence had not flagged. Automated scanners are useful inputs, but I do not rely on a single scan to decide that a site is clean.
I also handle malware removal for WordPress client sites as part of my current agency work.
Some WordPress malware is built to reinstall itself after a normal cleanup. In those cases, I look for the file, task, account, script or other mechanism that is putting the malware back.
I remove that persistence mechanism as part of the cleanup, then harden the site and monitor it afterward. That reduces the chance of the same infection returning, but it does not mean the site can never be hacked again.
Removing malware without addressing the entry point can leave the site open to another compromise. After cleanup, I look for evidence of how access was gained.
That can involve reviewing WordPress users, plugins, themes, file changes, server access and security settings. The cause is different from site to site, so I work from the evidence available rather than assuming one source.
My process is: assess, contain, clean, find the entry point, harden, then monitor.
After the cleanup, I put protections in place based on the site and hosting environment. This can include a firewall or Cloudflare, file integrity checks, two-factor authentication, login limits, new passwords and salts.
I also set up off-site backups and monitoring so there is a recovery path and a way to catch future problems earlier. Where useful, I block abusive bots or attack traffic at the server, firewall or Cloudflare level.
The goal is not just to remove the current malware. I also address the access and configuration issues I can identify so the site is in a safer state after recovery.
Card testing, also called carding, is a different attack from malware, but on the orders screen it can look like a hack: a run of small orders failing one after another. Someone is running stolen card numbers through your checkout to find the ones that still work.
If it is happening now, do these four things first:
Then I work on the store. I read the orders, the order notes and the logs for the pattern: small totals, the same product, many cards from a few IP addresses, and the route the attempts use. A Checkout block store takes orders at the Store API endpoint /wp-json/wc/store/v1/checkout, and the classic checkout posts to ?wc-ajax=checkout. WooCommerce's "Rate limiting Checkout block and Store API" setting covers only the first, so a classic checkout needs its limit elsewhere.
I set a rate limit on the order attempt and, on a site behind Cloudflare, a rule that challenges repeated requests to those two routes and leaves product pages, the cart and the gateway's webhook URL alone. Which request fields a Cloudflare rule can match depends on the plan, so the rule is written for the plan you have. I hide donation or name-your-price products while the attack runs and check the gateway settings: saved-card payments and adding a card from the customer account are turned off if testers are using them, and the gateway's secret API key must not have leaked, because with it testers can create payments through the processor's API without visiting your site. When the attempts stop, I watch the failed-order count for another spike and relax any rule that blocked a real customer.
The settings, the rate-limit code and the Cloudflare expressions are in my article on spotting and stopping WooCommerce card testing. This work is billed on the same terms as a malware cleanup, shown with the price on this page.
I keep client names and security incidents private. I have recovered about 17 hacked WordPress sites, but I do not publish details that could identify those clients or expose their security history.
If a prospective client needs more context before hiring me, I can walk through relevant past cases privately under NDA. I explain the type of problem, what I found and the work I carried out without publishing client information.
Guides
Track record
WordPress Developer
Half Price Packaging
Feb 2022 - Mar 2025
I worked as a WordPress Developer at Half Price Packaging from February 2022 to March 2025, full-time for most of that period and part-time from August to November 2023 and August 2024 to March 2025, when I mainly supported Custom Packaging Lane and Custom Stickers Factory. I reworked WordPress admin and theme components, and during my time there site performance improved 10x and traffic rose 5x based on PageSpeed Insights and Google Analytics measurements. I also removed malicious code and hardened the installation.
Web Developer
Salsoft Technologies
May 2021 - Jan 2022
I developed custom WordPress themes, templates and plugins at Salsoft Technologies. Caching and page-load improvements raised GTmetrix and Lighthouse scores. I also tested across browsers and carried out security audits.
Technical Insights
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Frequently Asked Questions
Every enquiry starts with a free assessment. A standard cleanup of one site with working hosting access is a fixed $149, agreed with you before work starts. A server, a multisite network or a site that keeps getting reinfected gets a fixed quote first.
I can start the same day during US working hours. The first step is to assess access, contain any active problem and determine what needs to be cleaned.
Yes. I have restored locked-out WordPress admin access and worked through cPanel or VPS servers over SSH when normal WordPress access was unavailable.
Yes. First tell your payment processor, turn on its fraud rules and do not ship any order placed during the attack. Then send the form with when the failed orders started and which payment gateway you use. I find the checkout route the attempts use, add a rate limit and a checkout challenge, and check the gateway settings, on the same terms as a malware cleanup.
No. I use the available evidence to inspect the WordPress installation, remove malware and injected scripts, and look for the entry point. On some past sites, I found malware that Sucuri and Wordfence scans had not flagged.
Some infections include a mechanism that reinstalls the malware after it is removed. I have experience finding and removing that persistence mechanism, then hardening and monitoring the site to reduce the chance of the same infection returning.
I harden the site based on what I find during the investigation. This can include a firewall or Cloudflare, file integrity checks, 2FA, login limits, new passwords and salts, off-site backups and monitoring.
Adjacent engagements
Next step
Send the site URL, what you are seeing, and what access you currently have for a free assessment. Do not send passwords or hosting credentials through the form. I will assess the infection first and agree a fixed price with you before any paid work starts.